Journal Article Critique
Agrell, W, “The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 2012, 27:1, p. 118-119.
In this particular article, the author identifies and espouses six fundamental processes that are very critical to change. According to the author, the six fundamental elements of change in the world of intelligence include the decreasing dominance of the national intelligence, the decreasing relative significance of exclusive sources as well as methods, the increase of novel fields of knowledge, the increase of a number of new actors in producing as well as providing intelligence, the decrease and substantial loss in terms of intellectual monopoly in the competitive knowledge world, and lastly, the increased demand for a more consistent evaluations as well as authentication in the disjointed environment of information.
The author also argues that the growing interest for the history of intelligence among people and their governments in the world today might act a way to learn many aspects not only regarding the past, but also concerning the various dynamics that shape and mould the future of intelligence and information among organizations, people, and governments. The authors defines the term “intelligence” as an involving activity and argues that the 21st era experience need to be considered as a period of ongoing transformation in terms of its institutions, roles, as well as methods. The author states that the beginning of 21st century brought an increasing interest in the history of intelligence, which defined the formative era for the process of intelligence as well as security. He furtherer argues that there exist a tremendous level of awareness that things might not remain the same forever, but many of the societies and governments today, stand to change and as a result, the need as well as conduct intelligence will undergo a transformation process.
In addition, the authors espouses that the perceptions concerning the future more often tend to reflect on the present as well as the eminent inability among people and their governments to consider fundamental changes, even if history has made these changes more explicit. As a mirror of the complexities of the historical change, the author argue that intelligence developments have been greatly hampered through people’s limitations to see or perceive the complex and indirect consequences of the social, technical, as well as cultural changes.
However, looking back into the 21st century of intelligence, the fundamental question remains to be whether or not this century represents the foundational era in which the level and development of intelligence developed to become the major element of national as well as international security. But, on further scrutiny, the 21st century has acted as a unique as well as a fundamental period in which national histories of many nations perceive the role of armed conflict as well as transformation in warfare as way for engagement. This same period, though, stand out as the most devastating in the history of humanity, which is characterized by varying ideologies and industrial technologies. As presented in Agrell’s article, there are many fundamental factors that have driven the transformation as well as establishments of intelligence, which have been witnessed in the 21st century, which includes the growth of demand for intelligence, the prevailing nature of the methods as well as problems in the conduct of intelligence, the tremendous stability as well as survivability of networks and organizations of intelligence, the evolution of the communities in which intelligence operates, as well as the double impact of the level of technological transformation. 
The arguments presented by Agrell concerning the level of intelligence after the end of Cold War are highly significant. The level of intelligence grew tremendously in order to meet the growing demand among people and many other institutions around the world. Agrell’s views have been supported by Goodman and Berkowitz in their article, “intelligence without the Cold War.” Moreover, Brecknridge in his article, “the shape of Post-Cold War intelligence,” also presents similar arguments concerning the development of intelligence after the end of the Cold War.
Immediately after ending the Cold War, the globe becomes a very safe place for humanity to exist, and since then not such a threat has emerged. Many of the threats that were considered to be of less importance during the Cold War have gained grounds along with many other emerging threats. Therefore, what this implies is that, information gathering is highly significant and crucial for the national security, though security systems of some nations including the United States have shrunk during the post-Cold War period. In addition, after the Cold War, the most important question that remained among various nationals was whether intelligence gathering was actually needed. Many of the opinions varied across a wide continuum in the manner of information collection and whether this could take place in order to re-evaluate the communities’ intelligence priorities.
While a number of people believe that economic intelligence need to be given the first priority, other hold that the process of information collection as well as information protection bears a greater significance that it was witnessed during the period of the Cold War. In the psot Cold-War, information collection, especially for the emerging democracies is very important in regard to military operations and nuclear power. Even though the Cold War period is over as mentioned above, the international setting is still rather dangerous in the 21st era. Right from the start of the 21st era, it became more obvious that intelligence performs an important function in both the national as well as international security. Many new threats, which include nontraditional challenges as well as threats, such as terrorism activities have been characterized in the international security.
The proliferation as well as arms control becomes one of the most critical responsibilities for the intelligence society. The major challenge for the intelligence agencies must be the international monitoring of the proliferation menace, as a number of nations are intending to acquire many weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons. The national governments needs and indeed, should offer intelligence services with the aims and means of overcoming the challenges of controlling weapons of mass destruction. However, this task might be a bit difficult, because many nations have designed as well as developed the capacities in order to maintain their weapons and much of their intentions remain much concealed.
Sometimes intelligence among people and institutions can fail and can be very interesting. The processes of intelligence can have more attention that successes and the level of success in the field of intelligence might be often unnoticed or be kept a secret. In addition, the issues surrounding the terms intelligence failure and success can also be very subjective. When it comes to intelligence failure, a number of fields come into interplay and the intelligence services are not the only ones to blame. A significant reason for intelligence failure could be lack of coordination among the intelligence communities themselves. Besides, the relationship among the intelligence services as well as national governments could be much conflictive, which may as a result render a big blow to the process of intelligence. Additionally, concerning the future of intelligence as argued by Agrell, the transformations of the past years have significantly contributed to a number of changes for the security as well as intelligence service, which is very normal, as the process of intelligence of very involving. The failures that followed the Iraq war as well as the 9/11 attacks have given importance to the process of reforming intelligence services and many of the ways in which intelligence functions have significantly evolved. Also, it is of great importance to state that intelligence collection will be a major factor in maintaining the national security of nations in the future, though, under totally different types of organizational and institutional models.
The main responsibilities of intelligence services, including covert action, analysis, collection, and counterintelligence, remain the most and fundamental methods for completing missions in the 21st era, even though there have been a number of transformations concerning those functions. Furthermore, the modern function of intelligence services remains very efficient for the processes of countering many of the traditional threats, which originate from other nations, but as the level of transnational threats are emerging; novel approaches and techniques are needed in considering the function of intelligence. In essence, there is no significant reform of the intelligence community, which has occurred. Moreover, the possibility of structural transformations and reforms have generally, been ignored.
Additionally, many of the structural issues of the intelligence community are impacting on intelligence collection as well as analysis, therefore, also affecting the perception of matters. It is also very important to note that an appropriate use or application of technology could help in saving a lot of resources. The main pillar of the intelligence reform in regard to the intelligence community must be the information sharing, which mostly applies to countering the issues of global threats of terrorism. Information sharing has been found to gain more attention, especially after the end of the 9/11 attacks in the United States.
Likewise, even though the changes and reforms regarding the structure as well as number of intelligence services might happen in the future, it is not expected that intelligence will disappear. Intelligence, will remain a significant process through which counterterrorism will be completely combated in the world today. Moreover, despite the limitations that have been identified in the past, intelligence has gained tremendous process throughout the history of the 21st century. Many and new technological advancements are expected in the future given the great establishments, which has been seen in today. This implies to the fact that the future of intelligence is very prosperous and great as opposed to the projections that intelligence in the future might be grim. Various actors, organizations, and individuals need to rise up for this eminent task in efforts of developing greater capacities to fight the modern as well as future problems that arise from terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction.
 Agrell, W, “The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 2012, 27:1, p. 118-119.
2 Agrell, 118-119.
3 Agrell, 118-119.
4 Agrell, 118-119.
5 Goodman, A, and Berkowitz, B, “Intelligence Without the Cold War”, Intelligence and National Security, 1994, p. 305-307.
6 Breckinridge, S, “The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1995, p. 1.
7 Goodman, A, and Berkowitz, B, “Intelligence Without the Cold War”, Intelligence and National Security, 1994, p. 305-307.
8 Breckinridge, S, “The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1995, p. 1.
9 Lahnerman, W, “The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm”, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2010, p. 209.
10 Goodman, M, “9/11: The failure of strategic intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 2003, p. 59-60.
11 Odom, W, Fixing intelligence: for a more secure America, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, p. 1-5.
12 Heazle, M, “Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty In Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters”, Intelligence and National Security, 2010, p. 291
13 Herman, M, “Counter-terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change”, Intelligence and National Security, 2003, p. 45.
14 Morrison, J, “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq”, Intelligence and National Security, 2011, p. 509.
15 Richards, Julian, “Intelligence Dilemma? Contemporary Counter-terrorism in a Liberal Democracy”, Intelligence and National Security, 2012, p. 761-762.
 W, Agrell. “The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 2012, 27:1, p. 118-119.
 Agrell, p. 118-119.
 Agrell, 118-119
 Agrell, 118-119.
 A. Goodman and B, Berkowitz. “Intelligence Without the Cold War”, Intelligence and National Security, 1994, p. 305-307.
 S, Breckinridge. “The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1995, p. 1.
 A. Goodman and B. Berkowitz. “Intelligence Without the Cold War”, Intelligence and National Security, 1994, p. 305-307.
 S. Breckinridge. “The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1995, p. 1.
 W. Lahnerman. “The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm”, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2010, p. 209.
 M. Goodman. “9/11: The failure of strategic intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 2003, p. 59-60.
 W. Odom. Fixing intelligence: for a more secure America, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, p. 1-5.
 M, Heazle. “Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty In Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters”, Intelligence and National Security, 2010, p. 291
 M, Herman. “Counter-terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change”, Intelligence and National Security, 2003, p. 45.
 J, Morrison. “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq”, Intelligence and National Security, 2011, p. 509.
 J, Richards. “Intelligence Dilemma? Contemporary Counter-terrorism in a Liberal Democracy”, Intelligence and National Security, 2012, p. 761-762.